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Abstract
Recent work in differential privacy has highlighted the shuffled model as a promising avenue
to compute accurate statistics while keeping raw data in users’ hands. We present a protocol in
this model that estimates histograms with error independent of the domain size. This implies
an arbitrarily large gap in sample complexity between the shuffled and local models. On the
other hand, we show that the models are equivalent when we impose the constraints of pure
differential privacy and single-message randomizers.
1 Introduction
The local model [16] of differentially private computation has minimal trust assumptions: n users
each execute a privacy-preserving algorithm on their data and send the output message to an
analyzer. While this model has appeal to the users—their data is never shared in the clear—
the analyzer receives very noisy signals. For example, the computation of d-bin histograms has
Ω(
√
log d /(ε
√
n)) error in the local model [3] but when users trust the analyzer with their raw data
(the central model), there is an algorithm that achieves O(log(1/δ)/(εn)) error which notably is
independent of d [7].
Because the local and central models lie at the extremes of trust, recent work has focused
on the intermediate shuffled model [6, 8]. A protocol in this model asks each user to execute a
randomized algorithm on their data, which generates a vector of messages. A trusted shuffler
applies a uniformly random permutation to all messages. The anonymity provided by the shuffler
allows users to introduce less noise than in the local model (to achieve the same level of privacy).
This prompts the following questions:
In terms of accuracy, how well separated is the shuffled model from the local model?
How close is the shuffled model to the central model?
1.1 Our Results
In this work, we provide a new protocol for histograms in the shuffled model (Section 3). To quantify
accuracy, we bound the simultaneous error : the maximum difference over all bins between each
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Table 1: Comparison of results for the histogram problem. To simplify the presentation, we assume
constant success probability, ε < 1, δ < 1/ log d for results from [11], and e−O(nε2) ≤ δ < 1/n for
our result.
Model Simultaneous Error No. Messages per User Source
Local Θ
(
1
ε
√
n
· √log d
)
1 [3]
Shuffled
O
(
1
εn ·
√
log d · log 1δ
)
O(d) [8]
O
(
1
εn log d+
1
ε2n
log 1δ
)
O
(
1
ε log
2 d+ 1
ε2
log d · log 1δ
)
w.h.p. [11]
O
(
log d
n +
1
εn ·
√
log d · log 1εδ
)
O
(
1
ε2 log
1
εδ
)
[11]
O
(
1
ε2n log
1
δ
)
O(d) [Theorem 3.2]
Central Θ
(
1
εn min
(
log d, log 1δ
))
N/A [9, 7, 4, 13]
bin’s estimated frequency and its true frequency in the input dataset. The simultaneous error of
our protocol is independent of the number of bins d. Table 1 presents our result alongside existing
results—all previous bounds on simultaneous error in the shuffled model depend on d.
Our next set of results concern problem settings where the dataset is drawn from an underlying
distribution. Here, we measure the sample complexity : the number of samples needed to accurately
estimate a parameter of the data distribution. The results from [8, 2, 12] all imply a polynomial
separation in sample complexity between the local and shuffled models.1 In Section 3.3, we prove
a much stronger result:
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Under approximate differential privacy, the separation in sample com-
plexity between the local and shuffled models is arbitrarily large. That is, there is an estimation
problem where the sample complexity in the local model scales with a parameter of the problem, but
the sample complexity in the shuffled model is independent of that parameter.
The above theorem follows from a careful application of our histogram protocol. The same
reduction technique also implies that there are some problems which require polynomially more
samples in the sequentially interactive local model than in the shuffled model.
In Section 4, we prove that the shuffled model collapses to the local model under constrained
settings, complementing Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Under pure differential privacy with single-message randomizers, the
shuffled model is equivalent to the local model.
2 Preliminaries
We define a dataset ~x ∈ X n to be an ordered tuple of n rows where each row is drawn from a
data universe X and corresponds to the data of one user. Two datasets ~x, ~x ′ ∈ X n are considered
neighbors (denoted as ~x ∼ ~x ′) if they differ in exactly one row.
1For example, [8] implies the sample complexity of Bernoulli mean estimation is O(1/α2 + log(1/δ)/(αε)) in the
shuffled model. This is in contrast with the lower bound of Ω(1/α2ε2) in the local model [5].
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Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [9]). An algorithm M : X n → Z satisfies (ε, δ)-differential
privacy if
∀~x ∼ ~x ′ ∀T ⊆ Z Pr[M(~x) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[M(~x ′) ∈ T ] + δ.
Let P = (R,A) be any single-message shuffled protocol that satisfies ε-differential privacy. Then
R is an ε-differentially private algorithm.
We say an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm satisfies pure differential privacy when δ = 0
and approximate differential privacy when δ > 0. For pure differential privacy, we may omit the δ
parameter from the notation.
Definition 2.2 (Local Model [16]). A protocol P in the (non-interactive2) local model consists of
two randomized algorithms:
• A randomizer R : X → Y that takes as input a single user’s data and outputs a message.
• An analyzer A : Y∗ → Z that takes as input all user messages and computes the output of
the protocol.
We denote the protocol P = (R,A). We assume that the number of users n is public and available
to both R and A. Let ~x ∈ X n. For ease of notation, we overload the definition of R and let
R(~x) = (R(x1), . . . , R(xn)). The evaluation of the protocol P on input ~x is
P(~x) = (A ◦R)(~x) = A(R(x1), . . . , R(xn)).
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy for Local Protocols). A local protocol P = (R,A) satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy for n users if its randomizer R : X → Y is (ε, δ)-differentially private (for
datasets of size one).
Definition 2.4 (Shuffled Model [6, 8]). A protocol P in the shuffled model consists of three ran-
domized algorithms:
• A randomizer R : X → Y∗ that takes as input a single user’s data and outputs a vector of
messages whose length may be randomized. If, on all inputs, the probability of sending a
single message is 1, then the protocol is said to be single-message. Otherwise, the protocol is
said to be multi-message.
• A shuffler S : Y∗ → Y∗ that concatenates all message vectors and then applies a uniformly
random permutation to (the order of) the concatenated vector. For example, when there are
three users each sending two messages, there are 6! permutations and all are equally likely to
be the output of the shuffler.
• An analyzer A : Y∗ → Z that takes a permutation of messages to generate the output of the
protocol.
As in the local model, we denote the protocol P = (R,A) and assume that the number of users
n is accessible to both R and A. The evaluation of the protocol P on input ~x is
P(~x) = (A ◦ S ◦ R)(~x) = A(S(R(x1), . . . , R(xn))).
2The literature also includes interactive variants; see [14] for a definition of sequential and full interactivity.
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Definition 2.5 (Differential Privacy for Shuffled Protocols [8]). A shuffled protocol P = (R,A)
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for n users if the algorithm (S◦R) : X n → Y∗ is (ε, δ)-differentially
private.
We remark that a randomizer in a local protocol is also a randomizer in a single-message shuffled
protocol and vice versa. Given such a randomizer, there exist amplification lemmas which quantify
the effect of shuffling on differential privacy [10, 2].
We also emphasize a difference in robustness between the local and shuffled models. A user in
a local protocol only has to trust that their own execution of R is correct to ensure differential
privacy. In contrast, a user in a shuffled protocol may not have the same degree of privacy when
other users deviate from the protocol. However, the privacy guarantees of existing shuffled protocols
typically degrade gracefully.
For any d ∈ N, let [d] denote the set {1, . . . , d}. For any j ∈ [d], we define the function
cj : [d]
n → R as the normalized count of j in the input
cj(~x) = (1/n) · |{i ∈ [n] : xi = j}|.
We use histogram to refer to the vector of normalized counts (c1(~x), . . . , cd(~x)). For measuring the
accuracy of a histogram protocol P : [d]n → Rd, we use the following metrics:
Definition 2.6. A histogram protocol P : [d]n → Rd has (α, β)-per-query accuracy if
∀~x ∈ [d]n ∀j ∈ [d] Pr[|P(~x)j − cj(~x)| ≤ α] ≥ 1− β.
Definition 2.7. A histogram protocol P : [d]n → Rd has (α, β)-simultaneous accuracy if
∀~x ∈ [d]n Pr[∀j ∈ [d] |P(~x)j − cj(~x)| ≤ α] ≥ 1− β.
3 The Power of Multiple Messages for Histograms
In this section, we present an (ε, δ)-differentially private histogram protocol in the shuffled model
whose simultaneous error does not depend on the universe size. We start by presenting a private
protocol for releasing a single count that always outputs 0 if the true count is 0 and otherwise
outputs a noisy estimate. The histogram protocol uses this counting protocol to estimate the
frequency of every domain element. Its simultaneous error is the maximum noise introduced to the
nonzero counts. There are at most n such counts.
For comparison, a naive solution found in [8] simply adds independent binomial noise to all
counts. The simultaneous error of such a protocol is the maximum noise over all d counts.
3.1 A Two-Message Protocol for Binary Sums
In the protocol Pzsumε,δ (Figure 1), each user adds their true x ∈ {0, 1} value to a Bernoulli value
z ∈ {0, 1} and reports a vector of length x+z ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The contents of each vector will be copies
of 1. Because the shuffler only reports a uniformly random permutation, the observable information
is equivalent to a noisy sum. The noise is distributed as Bin(n, p), where p is chosen so that there
is sufficient variance to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
To streamline the presentation and analysis, we assume that
√
(100/n) · ln(2/δ) ≤ ε ≤ 1 so
that p ∈ (1/2, 1). We can achieve (ε, δ) privacy for a broader parameter regime by setting p to a
different function; we refer the interested reader to Theorem 4.11 in [8].
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Figure 1: The pseudocode for Pzsumε,δ , a private shuffled protocol for normalized binary sums
Randomizer Rzsumε,δ (x ∈ {0, 1}) for ε, δ ∈ [0, 1]:
1. Let p← 1− 50
ε2n
ln(2/δ).
2. Sample z ∼ Ber(p).
3. Output ( 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
x+z copies
).
Analyzer Azsumε,δ (~y ∈ Z∗) for ε, δ ∈ [0, 1]:
1. Let p← 1− 50
ε2n
ln(2/δ).
2. Let c∗ = 1n · |~y|, where |~y| is the length of ~y.
3. Output
{
c∗ − p if c∗ > 1
0 otherwise
.
Theorem 3.1. For any ε, δ ∈ [0, 1] and any n ∈ N such that n ≥ (100/ε2) · ln(2/δ), the protocol
Pzsumε,δ = (Rzsumε,δ ,Azsumε,δ ) has the following properties:
i. Pzsumε,δ is (ε, δ)-differentially private in the shuffled model.
ii. For any β ≥ 2e−np(1−p), the error is |Pzsumε,δ (~x)− 1n
∑
xi| ≤ α with probability ≥ 1− β where
α = (1− p) + 2 ·
√
p(1− p)
n
· ln 2
β
= O
(
1
ε2n
log
1
δ
+
1
εn
·
√
log
1
δ
· log 1
β
)
.
iii. Pzsumε,δ ((0, . . . , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n copies
) = 0.
iv. Each user sends at most two one-bit messages.
Proof of Part i. If we let zi be the random bit generated by the i-th user, the total number of
messages is |~y| = ∑ni=1 xi + zi. Observe that learning |~y| is sufficient to represent the output of
shuffler since all messages have the same value. Thus, the privacy of this protocol is equivalent to
the privacy of
M(~x) =
n∑
i=1
xi + Bin(n, p) ∼ −
(
−
n∑
i=1
xi + Bin(n, 1− p)
)
+ n.
By post-processing, it suffices to show the privacy of Mneg(~x) = −
∑n
i=1 xi + Bin(n, 1 − p) where
1−p = 50
ε2n
ln 2δ . Because privacy follows almost immediately from technical claims in [11], we defer
the proof to Appendix A.
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Proof of Part ii. Fix any ~x ∈ {0, 1}n. For shorthand, we define α′ = 2 ·
√
p(1−p)
n · ln(2/β) so that
α = (1 − p) + α′. A Chernoff bound implies that for β ≥ 2e−np(1−p), the following event occurs
with probability ≥ 1− β:
Eacc =
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n ·
n∑
i=1
zi − p
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α′
}
.
The remainder of the proof will assume Eacc has occurred.
We perform case analysis. If c∗ > 1, then we show that the error of c∗ − p is at most α′:∣∣∣∣∣(c∗ − p)− 1n ·
n∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n ·
n∑
i=1
(xi + zi)− p− 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ (By construction)
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n ·
n∑
i=1
zi − p
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ α′ (By Eacc)
If c∗ ≤ 1, then the error is exactly 1n
∑
xi. We argue that c
∗ ≤ 1 implies 1n
∑
xi ≤ α:
1 ≥ c∗
=
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
(xi + zi) (By construction)
≥ 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
xi + p− α′ (By Eacc)
Rearranging terms yields
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ (1− p) + α′ = α
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Part iii. If ~x = (0, . . . , 0), then |~y| is drawn from 0 + Bin(n, p), which implies c∗ ≤ 1 with
probability 1. Hence, Pzsumε,δ (~x) = 0.
3.2 A Multi-Message Protocol for Histograms
In the protocol Phistε,δ (Figure 2), users encode their data xi ∈ [d] as a one-hot vector ~b ∈ {0, 1}d.
Then protocol Pzsumε,δ is executed on each coordinate j of ~b. The executions are done in one round
of shuffling. To remove ambiguity between executions, each message in execution j has value j.
Theorem 3.2. For any ε, δ ∈ [0, 1] and any n ∈ N such that n ≥ (100/ε2) · ln(2/δ), the protocol
Phistε,δ = (Rhistε,δ ,Ahistε,δ ) has the following properties:
i. Phistε,δ is (2ε, 2δ)-differentially private in the shuffled model.
ii. Phistε,δ has (α, β)-per-query accuracy for any β ≥ 2e−(25/ε
2)·ln(2/δ) and
α = O
(
1
ε2n
log
1
δ
+
1
εn
·
√
log
1
δ
· log 1
β
)
.
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Figure 2: The pseudocode for Phistε,δ , a private shuffled protocol for histograms
Randomizer Rhistε,δ (x ∈ [d]) for ε, δ ∈ [0, 1]:
1. For each j ∈ [d], let bj ← 1[x = j] and compute scalar product ~mj ← j · Rzsumε,δ (bj).
2. Output the concatenation of all ~mj.
Analyzer Ahistε,δ (~y ∈ [d]∗) for ε, δ ∈ [0, 1]:
1. For each j ∈ [d], let ~y(j) ← all messages of value j, then compute c˜j ← Azsumε,δ (~y(j)).
2. Output (c˜1, . . . , c˜d).
iii. Phistε,δ has (α, β)-simultaneous accuracy for any β ≥ 2ne−(25/ε
2)·ln(2/δ) and
α = O
(
1
ε2n
log
1
δ
+
1
εn
·
√
log
1
δ
· log n
β
)
.
iv. Each user sends at most 1 + d messages each of length O(log d).
The accuracy guaranteed by this protocol is close to what is possible in the central model: there
is a stability-based algorithm with simultaneous error O((1/(εn)) · ln(1/δ)) [7]. However, in Phistε,δ ,
each user communicates O(d) messages of O(log d) bits. It remains an open question as to whether
or not this can be improved while maintaining similar accuracy.
Because the simultaneous error of a single-message histogram protocol is at least Ω((1/(εn)) ·
poly(log d)) [8], this protocol is also proof that the single-message model is a strict subclass of the
multi-message model. This separation was previously shown by [2, 1] for the summation problem.3
Proof of Part i. Fix any neighboring pair of datasets ~x ∼ ~x ′. Let ~y ← S ◦ Rhistε,δ (~x) and ~y ′ ←
S ◦ Rhistε,δ (~x ′). For any j 6= j′, the count of j in output of the shuffler is independent of the count
of j′ in the output because each execution of Rzsumε,δ is independent. As in Step (1) of Ahistε,δ , for
j ∈ [d], let ~y(j) (~y ′(j) resp.) be the vector of all messages in ~y (~y ′ resp.) that have value j.
For any j ∈ [d] where cj(~x) = cj(~x ′), ~y(j) is identically distributed to ~y ′(j). For each of the two
j ∈ [d] where cj(~x) 6= cj(~x ′), we will show that the distribution of ~y(j) is close to that of ~y ′(j). Let
~r,~r ′ ∈ {0, 1}n where ri = 1[xi = j] and r′i = 1[x′i = j]. Now,
~y(j) ∼ j · (S ◦ Rzsumε,δ )(~r) and ~y ′(j) ∼ j · (S ◦ Rzsumε,δ )(~r ′).
So by Theorem 3.1 Part i, for any T ⊆ {j}∗,
Pr[~y(j) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[~y ′(j) ∈ T ] + δ.
(2ε, 2δ)-differential privacy follows by composition.
3In particular, a private unbiased estimator for
∑
i xi with real-valued xi ∈ [0, 1] in the single-message shuffled
model must have error Ω(n1/6) [2] while there exists a multi-message shuffled model protocol for estimating summation
with error O(1/ε) [1].
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Proof of Part ii-iii. Notice that the j-th element in the output c˜j is identically distributed with
an execution of the counting protocol on the bits bi,j indicating if xi = j. Formally, c˜j ∼
Pzsumε,δ ({bi,j}i∈[n]) for all j ∈ [d]. Per-query accuracy immediately follows from Theorem 3.1 Part ii.
To bound simultaneous error, we leverage the property that when cj(~x) = 0, the counting
protocol will report a nonzero value with probability 0. Let Q = {j ∈ [d] : cj(~x) > 0} and let α be
the error bound defined in Theorem 3.1 Part ii for the failure probability β/n.
Pr (∃j ∈ [d] s.t. |c˜j − cj(~x)| > α)
≤Pr (∃j ∈ Q s.t. |c˜j − cj(~x)| > α) + Pr (∃j /∈ Q s.t. |c˜j − cj(~x)| > α)
=Pr (∃j ∈ Q s.t. |c˜j − cj(~x)| > α) (Theorem 3.1 Part iii)
≤
∑
j∈Q
Pr (|c˜j − cj(~x)| > α)
≤
∑
j∈Q
β/n (Theorem 3.1 Part ii)
≤β (|Q| ≤ n)
This concludes the proof.
3.3 Applications
In this section, we use our histogram protocol to solve two parameter estimation problems; one
of these results implies a very strong separation in sample complexity between the non-interactive
local model and the shuffled model. Both parameter estimation problems reduce to what we call
support identification:
Definition 3.3 (Support Identification Problem). The support identification problem is specified
by two positive integers h ≤ d. Let D be a set of size d. Using UH to denote the uniform
distribution over a set H ⊆ D, the set of problem instances is {UH : H ⊆ D and |H| = h}. A
protocol solves the (h, d)-support identification problem with sample complexity n if, given n users
with data independently sampled from any problem instance UH , it identifies H with probability
at least 99/100.
We now show how to solve this problem in the shuffled model.
Claim 3.4. Let ε < 1 and δ < 1/h. Under (ε, δ)-differential privacy, the sample complexity of the
(h, d)-support identification problem is n = O(h log h · (1/ε2) · log(1/δ)) in the shuffled model.
Proof. For the purposes of this proof, we assume there is some bijection f between D and [d] so
that any reference to j ∈ [d] corresponds directly to some f(j) ∈ D and vice versa. Consider the
following protocol: execute Phistε,δ on n samples fromUH and then choose the items whose estimated
frequencies are at least (t+1)/n (the magnitude of t will be determined below). We will prove that
the items returned by the protocol are precisely those of H, with probability at least 99/100.
Let Esamp be the event that every element in support H has frequency at least (2t + 1)/n in
the sample. Let Epriv be the event that the histogram protocol estimates the frequency of every
element in D with error at most t/n. If both events occur, every element in H has estimated
frequency at least (t + 1)/n and every element outside H has estimated frequency at most t/n.
Hence, it suffices to show that Esamp and Epriv each occur with probability ≥ 199/200.
We lower bound the probability of Esamp via a coupon collector’s argument. That is, if we have
n = O(kh log h) samples from UH then each element of H appears at least k times with probability
at least 199/200. Hence we set k = (2t+ 1).
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To lower bound the probability of Epriv, we simply rephrase Theorem 3.2: with probability
≥ 199/200, every item in D is estimated up to error t/n for some t = O((1/ε2) · log(1/δ) + (1/ε) ·√
log(1/δ) · log(h)).4 Given that δ < 1/h, this simplifies to t = O((1/ε2) · log(1/δ)).
Having shown how to solve support identification with few samples, we now describe two pa-
rameter estimation problems and explain how to reduce these to support identification. This will
imply low sample complexity in the shuffled model.
Definition 3.5 (Pointer-Chasing Problem [15]). The pointer chasing problem is denoted PC(k, ℓ)
where k, ℓ are positive integer parameters. A problem instance is U{(1,a),(2,b)} where a, b are per-
mutations of [ℓ]. A protocol solves the PC(k, ℓ) with sample complexity n if, given n independent
samples from any U{(1,a),(2,b)}, it outputs the k-th integer in the sequence a1, ba1 , aba1 . . . with
probability at least 99/100.
To solve a PC(k, ℓ) instance, note that it suffices to find the support. Because the support has
size h = 2, Phistε,δ can be used to solve the problem with justO((1/ε2)·log(1/δ)) samples, independent
of k and ℓ. But in the case where k = 2, [15] gives a lower bound of Ω(ℓ/eε) for non-interactive
local protocols. So there is an arbitrarily large separation between the non-interactive shuffled and
non-interactive local models (Theorem 1.1).
Definition 3.6 (Multi-Party Pointer Jumping Problem [14]). The multi-party pointer jumping
problem is denoted MPJ(s, h) where s, h are positive integer parameters. A problem instance is
U{Z1,...,Zh} where each Zi is a labeling of the nodes at level i in a complete s-ary tree. Each label
Zi,j is an integer in {0, . . . , s−1}. The labeling implies a root-leaf path: if the i-th node in the path
has label Zi,j, then the (i+1)-st node in the path is the (Zi,j)-th child of the i-th node. A protocol
solves MPJ(s, h) with sample complexity n if, given n samples from any U{Z1,...,Zh}, it identifies the
root-leaf path with probability at least 99/100.
As with pointer-chasing, MPJ(s, h) is immediately solved when the support is identified. This
takes n = O(h log h · (1/ε2) · log(1/δ)) samples in the shuffled model. But [14] gives a lower bound
of Ω(h3/(ε2 log h)) for MPJ(s = h4, h) in the local model, even allowing for sequential interactivity.
However, we do not claim a polynomial separation between the shuffled model and sequentially
interactive local model. This would require a proof that the shuffled model is at least as powerful
as the sequentially interactive local model.
In the proof of Claim 3.4, one can imagine using a protocol with simultaneous error that depends
on the domain size d, e.g. the one in [8]. But t would in turn depend on d: using [8] implies that
t = Ω((1/ε) ·
√
log d · log(1/δ)). For PC(k, ℓ), d is the number of permutations of [ℓ] squared which
means that the sample complexity would scale with
√
ℓ log ℓ.
We remark that these reductions can also be applied in the central model. That is, instead of
executing Phistε,δ in the reduction (Claim 3.4), execute the central model algorithm, from [7], with
simultaneous error O((1/(εn)) · log(1/δ)). This improves the bounds by a 1/ε factor (see Table 2).
4The stated bound in Theorem 3.2 has a log n term. This is derived from a pessimistic bound on the number of
unique values that appear in the input. But in this reduction, we know that data takes one of h values.
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Table 2: The sample complexity of private pointer-chasing (PC) and multi-party pointer jumping
(MPJ). Results marked by * follow from a reduction to histograms.
Model PC(k, ℓ) MPJ(s, h)
Local
Ω(ℓ/eε) [15] Ω(h3/(ε2 log h)) [14]
for k = 2 for s = h4, seq. interactive
Shuffled O
(
1
ε2 log
1
δ
)
*
O
(
h log h · 1
ε2
log 1δ
)
*
for δ < 1/h
Central O
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
* O
(
h log h · 1ε log 1δ
)
*
4 Pure Differential Privacy in the Shuffled Model
In this section, we prove that a single-message shuffled protocol that satisfies ε-differential privacy
can be simulated by a local protocol under the same privacy constraint.
Theorem 4.1 (Formalization of Thm. 1.2). For any single-message shuffled protocol P = (R,A)
that satisfies ε-differential privacy, there exists a local protocol PL = (RL,AL) that satisfies ε-
differential privacy and PL(~x) is identically distributed to P(~x) for every input ~x ∈ X n.
We start with the following claim, which strengthens a theorem in [8] for the special case of
pure differential privacy in the shuffled model,
Claim 4.2. Let P = (R,A) be any single-message shuffled protocol that satisfies ε-differential
privacy. Then R is an ε-differentially private algorithm.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that R is not ε-differentially private. So there are values x, x′ ∈ X
and a set Y ⊆ Y such that
Pr[R(x) ∈ Y ] > eε · Pr[R(x′) ∈ Y ].
Let ~x = (x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n copies
) and ~x ′ = (x′, x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 copies
). Now consider Y n, the set of message vectors where
each message belongs to Y .
Pr[(S ◦ R)(~x) ∈ Y n] = Pr[R(~x) ∈ Y n]
= Pr[R(x) ∈ Y ]n
> eε · Pr[R(x′) ∈ Y ] · Pr[R(x) ∈ Y ]n−1
= eε · Pr[(S ◦ R)(~x ′) ∈ Y n]
which contradicts the fact that S ◦ R is ε-differentially private.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Consider the aggregator AL that applies a uniformly random permutation
to its input and then executes A. Then PL = (R,AL) is a local protocol that simulates P, in
the sense that PL(~x) is identically distributed to P(~x) for every ~x ∈ X n. And by Claim 4.2, the
randomizer is ε-differentially private.
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One might conjecture Claim 4.2 also holds for multi-message protocols and thus immediately
generalize Theorem 4.1. However, this is not the case:
Claim 4.3. There exists a multi-message shuffled protocol that is ε-differentially private for all
ε ≥ 0 but its randomizer is not ε-differentially private for any ε ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider the randomizer R∞ that on input x ∈ {0, 1} outputs two messages x and 1 − x.
The output of the shuffler S ◦ R∞ is 0-differentially private since for all inputs the output is a
random permutation of exactly n 0s and n 1s. However, R∞ is not ε-differentially private for any
ε > 0 as the first message of R∞(x) is that user’s bit x.
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A Privacy via Smooth Distributions
Ghazi, Golowich, Kumar, Pagh and Velingker [11] identify a class of distributions and argue that,
if η is sampled from such a distribution, adding η to a 1-sensitive sum ensures differential privacy
of that sum.
Definition A.1 (Smooth Distributions, [11]). A distribution D over Z is (ε, δ, k)-smooth if for all
k′ ∈ [−k, k],
Pr
Y∼D
[
PrY ′∼D[Y ′ = Y ]
PrY ′∼D[Y ′ = Y + k′]
≥ e|k′|ε
]
≤ δ.
Lemma A.2 (Smoothness for Privacy, [11]). Let f : Zn → Z be a function such that |f(~x)−f(~x ′)| ≤
1 for all ~x ∼ ~x ′. Let D be an (ε, δ, 1)-smooth distribution. The algorithm that takes as input ~x ∈ Zn,
then samples η ∼ D and reports f(~x) + η satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
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Lemma A.3 (Binomial Distribution is Smooth, [11]). For any positive integer n, γ ∈ [0, 1/2],
α ∈ [0, 1], and any k ≤ αγn/2, the distribution Bin(n, γ) is (ε, δ, k)-smooth with
ε = ln
1 + α
1− α and δ = exp
(
−α
2γn
8
)
+ exp
(
− α
2γn
8 + 2α
)
.
Corollary A.4. Fix any ε, δ ∈ [0, 1]. Let n ≥ (100/ε2) · ln(2/δ). The algorithm Mneg that takes
as input ~x ∈ {0,−1}n then samples
η ∼ Bin
(
n, 50 · ln(2/δ)
nε2
)
and reports η +
∑
xi satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. When α = (eε − 1)/(eε + 1) observe that α ∈ [ε/√5, 1) and Lemma A.3 implies that η is
sampled from an (ε, δ, 1)-smooth distribution:
ln
1 + α
1− α = ln
(eε + 1) + (eε − 1)
(eε + 1)− (eε − 1) = ε
and
exp
(
−α
2γn
8
)
+ exp
(
− α
2γn
8 + 2α
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−α
2γn
10
)
(α < 1)
≤ 2 exp
(
−γε
2n
50
)
= δ.
So by Lemma A.2, we have Mneg is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
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